FinTech revolution: the impact of management information systems upon relative firm value and risk by Mitra, S. et al.
Vol.:(0123456789) 
Journal of Banking and Financial Technology 
https://doi.org/10.1007/s42786-020-00023-0
ORIGINAL ARTICLE
FinTech revolution: the impact of management information systems 
upon relative firm value and risk
Sovan Mitra1  · Andreas Karathanasopoulos2
Received: 16 August 2019 / Accepted: 21 September 2020 
© The Author(s) 2020
Abstract
The FinTech or ‘financial technology’ revolution has been gaining increasing interest as technologies are fundamentally 
changing the business of financial services. Consequently, financial technology is playing an increasingly important role 
in providing relative performance growth to firms. It is also well known that such relative performance can be observed 
through pairs trading investment. Therefore pairs trading have implications for understanding financial technology perfor-
mance, yet the relationships between relative firm value and financial technology are not well understood. In this paper we 
investigate the impact of financial technology upon relative firm value in the banking sector. Firstly, using pairs trade data 
we show that financial technologies reveal differences in relative operational performance of firms, providing insight on the 
value of financial technologies. Secondly, we find that contribution of relative firm value growth from financial technologies 
is dependent on the specific business characteristics of the technology, such as the business application and activity type. 
Finally, we show that financial technologies impact the operational risk of firms and so firms need to take into account both 
the value and risk benefits in implementing new technological innovations. This paper will be of interest to academics and 
industry professionals.
Keywords FinTech · Financial technology · Operational risk · Relative firm value · Firm value · Risk management · Pairs 
trading · Shareholder value
1 Introduction
The financial technology or ‘FinTech’ revolution has enabled 
financial services to fundamentally change their businesses 
[1], by allowing firms to offer new products, new business 
processes and business models, to name a few everyday 
examples of FinTech would include bitcoin, big data ana-
lytics and peer to peer lending. Such innovation has been 
embraced by the financial sector, as firms are constantly 
seeking opportunities to differentiate themselves from com-
petitors and allow companies to increase their firm value 
(or equivalently share prices) relative to their competitors 
(see [2–5]).
A consequence of the increase in FinTech has been 
an increased dependence upon it. This is because, firstly, 
increasingly larger amounts of data need to be managed, 
across a range of business lines and eventualities. Secondly, 
FinTech is increasingly being required to manage funda-
mental financial operations, such as analysis, reporting and 
modelling, with an increasing drive towards automating all 
financial processes. Finally, operational and IT management 
are increasingly being regarded as a strategic resource for 
competitive advantage; see for instance [6–9].
The use of operational factors to give competitive advan-
tages (and so relative firm value growth) has already been 
supported by researchers (e.g. [10–13]) and this has also 
occurred in the banking sector. For example, the Merrill 
Lynch Cash Management Account System [14] is cited as a 
case where Merrill Lynch were able to capture 90% of the 
investment account market within 1 year of operation of the 
system.
Although there is no overwhelming consensus of opinion 
on the contribution of FinTech to firm value or relative firm 
value (see for instance [15–17]), it is well recognised that 
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investors profit from relative firm performances by engag-
ing in pairs trades of firms’ shares. Pairs trading is a trading 
strategy where an investor takes a ‘long’ and ‘short’ position 
in two different stocks [18], with the intention to benefit 
from relative share price growth (or equivalently the rela-
tive firm value growth) between the two firms. Moreover, 
using a standard model of operational risk (hereon OR) in 
the financial sector [19] it can be shown that pairs trading 
returns provide a measure on the difference in OR between 
the two financial firms (to be explained in more detail in the 
proceeding sections).
Consequently pairs trade (hereon PT) returns (which are 
equivalent to relative firm value growth) enable us to under-
stand the contribution of FinTech and OR. Despite this, there 
is a lack of literature on relative firm value. This is particu-
larly unusual, given that operational management has been 
studied as a source of firm value creation; for example see 
[20] and [21] to name a few articles.
The lack of literature can be explained by, firstly, financial 
technology research tending to address a specific characteris-
tic, rather than investigating a broad range of characteristics 
(for example see [22, 23]). Consequently, our understanding 
of different FinTech issues impacting firm value, OR, etc. 
is limited. Secondly, FinTech research relating to firm value 
tends to be concerned with the firm’s absolute value or its 
growth independent of other firms (for example see [24]). 
Consequently, we do not understand the contribution of 
financial technology to firm value relative to its competitors. 
Finally, PT literature tends to be concerned with investment 
strategies (e.g. [25, 26]), which focus on extracting empirical 
relationships on price data.
The scarce research literature upon FinTech, OR and rela-
tive firm value has meant that these interrelated areas are 
not fully understood. For example, are there specific finan-
cial technologies, designed for a particular business line, 
that could impact relative firm value more than other busi-
ness lines? Are there particular financial technologies that 
increase OR more than other financial technologies? If so, 
does this impact a bank’s FinTech strategy in any way?
In this paper we investigate financial technologies and 
their relation to relative firm value growth (or equivalently 
PT returns) and OR. Using operational event data and over 
11,000 pairs trades data, we investigate PT returns, OR and 
the relation to financial technologies. This paper makes a 
number of contributions. Firstly, using pairs trade data we 
show that financial technologies reveal differences in relative 
operational performance of firms. Using market data we are 
able to provide a more realistic assessment of the contribu-
tion of financial technology to firms.
The advantage of utilising empirical market data is that 
we are not reliant on a theoretical approach to examine 
operational issues. Consequently, such an approach can 
help resolve the widely cited ‘productivity paradox’ [27]. 
This paradox is related to the fact that productivity tends to 
decrease as increased investment is made in improving pro-
ductivity (particularly in areas such as IT). The reasons relat-
ing to decreased productivity tend to be related to human 
and decision making factors, rather than pure electronic or 
technological causes, consequently the issues in the ‘produc-
tivity paradox’ [27] are relevant in the twenty-first century as 
they were in the twentieth century, as well as in developed 
or developing countries.
Secondly, we find that contribution of relative firm value 
growth from financial technologies is dependent on the 
specific business characteristics of the technology, such as 
the business application and activity type. Thus firms can 
improve relative firm value contribution by strategically re-
allocating or concentrating on particular financial business 
lines and operational events. Finally, we find that financial 
technologies impact the operational risk of firms and so 
firms need to take into account both the value and risk ben-
efits in implementing new technological innovations. New 
FinTech products and services (from hereon FPAS) should 
bear in mind such variations to maximise relative firm value 
and minimise OR.
The rest of the paper is organised as follows: in the next 
section we introduce PT, FinTech in the financial sector, OR 
and the motivation of our study. We then provide a literature 
review, we then discuss our research methodology and our 
data. We then discuss our results, analyse them and end with 
a conclusion.
2  Related literature and motivation of study
The financial technology or ‘FinTech’ revolution has arisen 
from a convergence in technology and finance that has pro-
vided a new means for financial services to fundamentally 
change their businesses, even in developing countries [28]. 
Financial technology has been defined [29] as the systems 
that model, value, and process financial products. Financial 
technology has allowed financial services to offer new busi-
ness models (such as online wealth management to new cus-
tomer segments), new products (such as digital wallets and 
bitcoin) and new business processes (such as big data ana-
lytics). As financial firms are increasingly pushing towards 
automating many processes (for the benefits of efficiency, 
effectiveness and cost), financial processes nowadays are 
almost entirely IT generated and managed.
The usage of financial technologies to give competitive 
advantages within the banking sector has been well docu-
mented by a number of researchers. A classic example is the 
case study of the Merrill Lynch Cash Management Account 
system [14]. The system is frequently cited as not only 
improving banking operations but also providing a competi-
tive advantage on new products and banking performance. 
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The system enabled Merrill Lynch to capture 90% of the 
investment account market within the first year of operation 
[30]. Other examples include Fuster et al. [31] who exam-
ined FinTech improving the productivity of mortgage lend-
ing, in Monaco [32] high frequency trading and FinTech 
are discussed and their impact on market structures (such as 
trading volume and market orders).
To summarise, the role of FinTech or IT and technol-
ogy investment in the banking sector in recent years has 
focussed on a number of different areas to improve produc-
tivity and competitiveness; in particular there has been a 
focus on peer to peer lending, cryptocurrencies and smart 
contracts. Such products and services will have fundamental 
impacts on standard financial intermediation services, they 
will also affect credit markets as deposits and capital raising 
can be executed in different formats. In fact, peer to peer 
lenders will be able to gain market share from traditional 
banks for saving and lending. Moreover, FinTech will also 
disrupt traditional payment systems, leading to different 
money market instruments and implications for monetary 
policy from central banks. We note that whilst ‘bottlenecks’ 
for implementation of FinTech may exist in developed or 
developing countries, it is still likely that FinTech will have 
a significant influence.
Pairs trading is a stock trading strategy that involves tak-
ing a ‘long’ position in one stock and a ‘short’ position in 
another stock [18]. The two firms are rival companies, that 
is they are firms that compete in similar market segments 
and industries, typically for the same group of customers. 
Consequently, rival firms tend to operate in the same indus-
try, stock market, country etc., and PT is generally applied 
to rival firms only rather than any set of firms. In fact stocks 
involved in PT tend to exhibit high correlations, and such 
stocks have been used in many instance to create natural 
‘hedges’, for instance one can create ‘market neutral’ trades 
to remove market risk by constructing appropriate PT strate-
gies. The PT strategy also benefits from relative share price 
growth (or equivalently the relative firm value growth) 
between the two firms. The fact that the trading strategy 
relies on relative firm value growth to achieve a profit is 
reflected by the fact the PT method is often called a ‘relative 
value’ trading strategy [33].
Operational risk, the risk arising from business opera-
tions within a firm [34], has been gaining increasing inter-
est in literature (see for instance [35, 36]). A consequence 
of the increasing emphasis on financial technologies has 
been a greater sophistication and dependence on financial 
technologies and this has substantially affected OR [37, 38]. 
For example, [39] claim that data breaches lead to severe 
financial losses, IT infrastructure attacks are estimated to 
cost as much as $2.4 million [40], firms are now investing 
in cyberinsurance [41] and unauthorised trading in Allied 
Irish Bank caused a $750 million loss [42].
In Ref. [19] a standard model of OR in financial firms is 
modelled by the following equation:
where R(A) is the total risk of company A, RM(A), RC(A) and 
ROR(A) are the market, credit and operational risk, respec-
tively, of company A. The credit risk is defined as the risk 
of the company defaulting on any payments it is obliged to 
fulfil [43], the market risk is the risk associated with market 
movements affecting the market valuation of the company 
[44].
If we apply the Eq. (1) model to a PT and we assume we 
are long in stock A and short in another stock B, then the 
overall PT position has risk:
Thus the net return in a PT occur due to the differences 
in OR between the stocks in the PT. Hence PT profits are 
directly impacted by the relative operational performance 
between firms. We obtain Eq. (2) because the market and 
credit risks will be similar in a PT, as similar stocks are 
chosen (i.e. same sector, market etc.). This means that we 
cancel out credit and market risks. Market risk cancellation 
is supported by financial models (for instance similar stocks 
in the CAPM model [45] would cancel each other’s market 
risk), and has also been well documented in a number of 
PT studies; see for instance [26, 46, 47] to name a few. The 
credit risks are also cancelled out because credit risk is typi-
cally determined by fundamentals of a company [48], and 
since similar stocks have similar fundamentals the credit risk 
would also be cancelled out in the PT.
The result of Eq. (2) or PT returns depending on OR is 
not an unexpected outcome. This is because it is already well 
known that operational factors lead to key strategic advan-
tages (and so relative firm value growth) over competitors 
[12]. For example, [13] claims that OR is directly related to 
Porter’s five forces of competitive advantage (see [49, 50] 
for more detail). Additionally [13] directly relates the risk in 
business operations to a company’s competitiveness.
To the best of our knowledge there is no literature on 
financial technology, OR and PT (or equivalently relative 
firm value growth). Although, there is a vast amount of 
research on OR and operations technology (for instance see 
[50–55]), the research typically focusses on a single aspect 
(see for instance [22, 23, 56–58] rather than a wide range 
of factors, for example in [59] only two operational factors 
are analysed. Moreover, the majority of research focuses on 
individual firm value, independent of its competitors, rather 
than the firm value added relative to its competitors.
Given that firms make substantial investments (multi-
million dollar) in operational technology (see for instance 
[60, 61]), it is surprising that there is little literature on 
(1)R(A) = RM(A) + RC(A) + ROR(A),
(2)R(A) − R(B) = ROR(A) − ROR(B).
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the relation between this, OR and PT (or relative firm 
value). Furthermore, there are substantial incentives to 
understand such relationships, such as improved OR man-
agement and better expenditure. With the rise of FPAS, it 
is important for financial firms to understand what factors 
maximise firm value and minimise OR.
A possible cause for the little research upon finan-
cial technology, OR and PT (or relative firm value) is 
that firstly financial technology has only recently been 
gaining importance. Previously, operational technology 
and FPAS were not perceived as major components to 
competitive advantage in firms. Similarly, it has not been 
understood until recently that financial technology can 
directly impact profitability; nowadays the impact is more 
noticeable, for example [59] estimated the median loss 
from operations in US financial institutions to be $11.8 
million.
The literature that is closest to our research is [24], 
which investigates the relation between firm value (share 
price) and the introduction of operational technology. 
However, the relative firm value gains are not investi-
gated, rather the firm value gains independent of its com-
petitors are quantified. This means that such firm value 
gains may not provide any gains relative to its peers, and 
so may not provide any competitive advantage. Addition-
ally, [24] do not consider a wide range of factors but a 
small number of generic factors (e.g. industry sector and 
firm size).
The lack of literature on financial technology, OR and 
PT (or equivalently relative firm value growth) implies 
it is not well understood. In particular, one may wish to 
understand how key operational aspects such as business 
lines and operational event types impact performance? 
Is there any impact on firm risk as a result of increasing 
financial technology and to what extent? This therefore 
leads us to address the following research questions:
– To analyse the impact of operational events upon firm 
performance, in terms of relative firm value.
– To analyse the impact of operational events upon firm 
performance, in terms of OR.
– To analyse the impact of the type of operational event 
on firm performance, in terms of the operational activ-
ity and business line.
3  Methodology and data
In this section we explain our methodology, the experi-
ments executed and the data sample used in our study.
3.1  Pairs trade methodology
In PT we setup a pairs trade by taking a long position in one 
firm’s shares and a short position in a similar firm’s shares 
simultaneously; at the point we wish to exit the pairs trade 
we simultaneously exit both positions, that is we sell the 
long position stock and exit the short position.
The PT return  rPT is calculated using Eq. (3):
where SL(t), SL(0) are the long position stock prices at time 
t and 0, respectively; SS(t), SS(0) are the short position stock 
prices at time t and 0, respectively.
To analyse PT in more detail we model PT returns simi-
lar to stock returns. According to MacKinlay [62] the stock 
returns consist of two components:
where  re (also known as the abnormal returns) is the stock 
return component due to the event itself (if an event occurs), 
and  rse is the total stock return. The  rn is defined as the nor-
mal or the expected stock return when no event occurs. For 
PT we now have:
where  rALL is the overall PT return,  rNPT is the PT return 
when there is no operational event and  rE is the PT return 
due to the operational event itself only (if an event occurs). 
For convenience we define
and rPTE = rE + rNPT when an event occurs. Therefore PT 
returns during an operational event (rPTE) do not equal the 
PT returns due to the operational event itself (rE). To obtain 
the operational event (hereon OE) returns relating to the OE 
itself we require rE returns, which requires rPTE and rNPT as 
well. The  rNPT can be calculated from empirical results by 
using the PT returns when there are no events.
As rNPT is defined as returns outside an OE, rNPT therefore 
includes two types of possible returns: (i) mismatching error 
based returns (ii) OR related returns that occur outside OE. 
In both cases, although their returns maybe non-zero we 
would still consider them to be negligible in expectation. In 
relation to (i): theoretically two stocks in a PT should elimi-
nate common risks (and their associated returns), however 
stocks are not able to completely eliminate common risks 
as stocks are difficult to perfectly match with common risk 
factors. Consequently we expect this mismatching in com-
mon risk factors to lead to a small but insignificant return. 
Note that we do not expect the mismatching to give signifi-










(4)rse = re + rn,
(5)rALL = rE + rNPT
(6)rALL = rPTE, if an event occurs
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method to make consistent profits. The insignificant returns 
are also supported by our practical results discussed in pro-
ceeding sections.
In relation to (ii), not all returns related to OR should be 
expected to occur during an OE; some of the OR related 
return will occur outside an OE, although this would be neg-
ligible compared to rE. A similar process occurs in other 
risk factor returns, for example in credit risk not all credit 
risk related returns occur during a credit risk event (such as 
default), there will be returns outside the events (see [56, 
63], for examples). Hence corporate bonds must provide 
higher returns to investors, to provide a return that is con-
sistent with returns related to credit risk (regardless of credit 
events occurring).
The PT are traded for time intervals of 1 week; a period 
of 1 week was chosen to so that all operational information 
is completely reflected by the share prices (a shorter time 
interval would not allow this). The efficient market hypoth-
esis [64] implies that a firm’s stock price fully reflects all the 
available information of the firm. This means that the stock 
price will change to fully reflect all the available information 
on its performance and its impact upon firm value [65]. In 
a highly traded and well informed stock market, such as the 
US stock market, the incorporation of information within 
stock prices is not a stringent assumption and has been used 
in Ref. [66].
3.2  Operational risk measurement
We require an OR measure to conduct our experiments. 
In Ref. [67] a downside risk measure is used but this is a 
generic risk measure rather than an OR specific risk meas-
ure, in Ref. [68] a real options risk measure is applied but 
this is suitable for evaluating a single project, rather than 
hundreds or thousands of events. There already exist generic 
OR measures (such as the Basic Indicator Approach and 
Standardised Approach [34] which have a wide range of 
applicability due to their minimal data requirements. How-
ever both measures are unsuitable for our study for a number 
of reasons; firstly, they do not measure risk with respect 
to particular events, rather they are quite broad measures. 
Consequently, we would not be able to analyse the risk 
related to particular OE or PT, which is the main focus of 
our study. Secondly, both OR measures are measuring risk 
on low frequency periods (e.g. risk over annual or quarterly 
periods; given that our PT are conducted on a weekly basis 
and we would likely to examine a number of OE through 
a year, such measures are not suitable for our study. The 
OR measure is not sensitive to frequency of data, rather the 
occurrence of events.
Using risk measurement theory [69] we can measure 
the risk related to a given risk factor, by applying a risk 
measure to the return distribution related to the risk factor 
(e.g. quantiles or value at risk, and standard deviation [70]). 
Therefore to measure OR we require the return distribution 
related to OR returns. In formal terms, OR risk λ is given by 
applying some statistical measure (e.g. quantile), denoted 
by f(.), upon the return distribution κ associated with OR 
returns:
To obtain the return distribution κ (from which one can 
obtain a measure of OR), we need to obtain returns due to 
OR only. Using Eq. (2) we see that PT returns are due to OR 
only, hence to measure OR we require the distribution of 
PT returns. We can measure the OR during an OE using the 
return distribution for rPTE or we can measure the OR during 
no OE using the return distribution for rNPT.
Unlike other risk measures, Eq. (7) enables us to meas-
ure OR on weekly time scales, its data requirements are not 
highly demanding (only requires stock price data) and can 
be easily implemented. Such properties are not available 
with other OR measures, for example the Basic Indicator 
Approach and the Standardised Approach risk measures use 
gross income data [34], which is typically published on an 
annual basis and harder to obtain than stock price data.
3.3  Experiments and data
In this study we examine over 11,000 pairs trade data; the PT 
positions are arranged so that we short the firm that incurs 
the operational event (and we are long the other stock in the 
pair). Therefore, PT have net positive returns if an opera-
tional event occurs, as such an event should reduce the firm 
value of the shorted firm (leading to a positive return) while 
the other stock is unaffected. We identify PT during and 
excluding OE by using the specific dates of OE provided by 
the Fitch database on OE. We note that within each PT we 
are long one stock only and short one stock only; given that 
we include eight different banks in our sample therefore we 
have 28 different types of pairs in total in our study.
Using Eq. (3) we calculate the PT returns for each PT, so 
that we can produce a distribution of PT returns. Once we 
have a distribution of returns we can measure the OR (see 
OR measurement section for more information). The return 
in Eq. (3) is calculated using the closing prices for each stock 
and t is set to 1 week for all trades. The trades in the same 
pair of stocks are executed in non-overlapping time intervals, 
so that an identical pair is never in trade more than once at 
any point in time.
The stocks for the PT were all taken from the US bank-
ing sector, namely eight different banks and gives 28 differ-
ent pairs in total; we note in passing that the same number 
of banks were used in Ref. [66] to study OR. The stocks 
were chosen on specific criteria: firstly, we required large 
(7) = f ().
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market capitalisation because such stocks tend to be effi-
ciently priced and so their stock prices would fully reflect 
OE information. Secondly, we eliminated stocks with gaps 
in their stock price data during our sample of study, as gaps 
can distort results. Finally, we chose stocks with sufficient 
OE in our period of study, to enable adequate analysis of 
their results.
The sample period for study was chosen to be 2000–2007; 
a 7 years sample period would provide a sufficiently rep-
resentative distribution of results for our analysis, which 
would also provide reliable OR measurements (see OR 
measurement section for more information). Moreover, a 
longer sample period of study removes biases in the eco-
nomic cycle affecting PT results. No data was used prior to 
the Global Financial Crisis (2007) as many financial stocks 
were affected by non-rational pricing after the start of the 
Global Financial Crisis. Such irrational pricing would be 
contrary to the efficient market hypothesis and therefore our 
methodology would no longer be valid; this is because our 
methodology relies on rational pricing in the market in order 
to have PT to give correct returns.
The year 2000 was chosen as the start period of our data 
as this coincides with the beginning of the FinTech era. 
Although the beginning of the FinTech era has no widely 
accepted start date (e.g. some researchers claim it is from 
the introduction of ATMs, others with more sophisticated 
technologies such as sophisticated predictive analytics), we 
consider a viable starting point to be the time the majority of 
banks began offering internet banking facilities to the public 
(approximately the year 2000). This is because this marked 
a pronounced change in the financial services offered by 
banks, along with a pronounced change in financial tech-
nology used by banks (the extensive usage of the internet).
The PT returns during OE were investigated in terms of 
their operational origin, specifically the OE’s originating 
business line and the type of OE. These two factors were 
chosen because they are deemed to have the most signifi-
cant impact on FPAS; FPAS are being offered across all 
different financial business lines (from business analytics to 
retail banking transactions) therefore it is important to see 
the impact of business lines upon OE. Additionally FPAS 
include a wide range of products and services (from bitcoins 
to crowdfunding) hence it is important to understand how a 
wide range of OE types impact the firm.
The operational database provided us with details on OE 
themselves, in terms of their business line and event type 
origins. Hence in our PT analysis we were able to classify 
returns by both factors. The business line categories fol-
lowed the Basel banking regulator categories (see [71]), and 
reflect the generic business lines that would exist in banks. 
Similarly, the OE categories chosen followed the interna-
tional banking regulators Basel’s categories and were as 
follows:
– Internal and external fraud: for example unauthorised or 
unreported activities such as impersonation, manipula-
tion of IT systems and theft of information. The World 
Bank claims financial technology has a major role in pre-
venting fraud.
– Workplace practices and business practices: examples of 
errors in workplace practices would be usage of unau-
thorised systems and lack of security e.g. Ebay reported 
cyber attacks on their IT systems due to a lack of work-
place security practices. Workplace practices have been 
cited as sources of firms failing to realise the IT system’s 
full potential [72]. Examples of errors in business prac-
tices would be disclosure of sensitive information to third 
parties (see for an example [49, 50]), market manipu-
lation using IT systems and exceeding client exposure 
limits. For example, the LIBOR scandal led to market 
manipulation of interest rates and Barclays Bank being 
fined multimillion dollar amounts.
– Physical assets damage: for example physical damage 
(accidental or deliberate) to IT systems such as data cen-
tres or networks.
– Process management: for example data entry errors, other 
incorrect recording and outsourcing issues (see [70–75] 
for examples).
4  Results and analysis
In this section we present our results and analyse them.
4.1  Results
See Tables 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10 and 11.        
4.2  Analysis
In Tables 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8 and 9 we present the results 
for all our PT in our study; Tables 10 and 11 detail our OE 
types and business lines used in our study. In Table 1 the 
Table 1  Returns for all pairs trades (rALL), pairs trades during an 
operational event (rPTE), and pairs trade event returns (rE)
a PTE denotes PT during an operational event, and SD denote stand-
ard deviation, for all tables
Return (%) Pairs trade Event (rE)
All (rALL) PTEa (rPTE)
Expected return 0.04 0.12 0.17
Annualised expected return 2.28 6.19 8.79
Annualised median return 5.14 13.52 16.12
Annualised return interquartile 
range
184.42 160.98 160.98
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‘All’ results denote the results relating to all 11,648 PT, 
including all PT during and outside any OE; the ‘PTE’ 
results denote PT returns during OE only, and ‘Event’ 
results denote rE returns (that is PT return due to the event 
itself). The figures in all the tables refer to values over the 
1 week duration for the PT; however the annualised values 
are the weekly values converted to their annual equivalent 
e.g. weekly expected returns are converted to their annual 
equivalent.
We note in passing that in order to calculate rE requires 
rALL (given in tables) and rNPT; mean rNPT was calculated to 
be − 0.05% per trade. On an annualised basis this is approxi-
mately equivalent to a magnitude of 2.6%, which is also 
approximately equal to the risk free rate during the period 
of study (the US interest rates fluctuated between 1 and 6%, 
with an approximate average of 3%). Hence the rNPT return 
is negligible and not economically significant. We also note 
that we would not expect rNPT to be economically significant 
because rNPT is defined as the return during no event, and 
as discussed previously such returns would be expected to 
be negligible.
The OR was calculated using risk measures: VaR (value 
at risk) at different quantiles, SD (standard deviation), the 
third and fourth moments (skewness and kurtosis, respec-
tively). The OR associated with the results in Table 1 are 
presented in Tables 2, 3, 4 and 5; Table 2 provides the risk 
measures under rALL results, in Tables 3, 4 and 5 we present 
the change in the risk measure’s value under the rPTE and rE 
when compared rALL risk measure results.
To test the empirical distributions for following a Normal 
distribution but with the same SD, we conducted Kolmogo-
rov–Smirnoff tests. The Normal distribution test was con-
ducted to determine the empirical distribution’s likelihood 
of outliers in its distribution (compared to a Normal distribu-
tion) but also a non-Normal distribution typically increases 
the likelihood of incorrectly modelling and estimating risk. 
In Table 2 a Kolmogorov–Smirnoff test is executed, to test 
rALL distribution against a Normal distribution with 0 mean 
but with same SD (3.65); we denote the Normal distribution 
by N(0, 3.65). Similarly, in Table 4 a Kolmogorov–Smirnoff 
test is executed to test rPTE distribution against N(0, 3.27), a 
Normal distribution with 0 mean but with same SD as rPTE 
distribution (3.27).
In Table 3 we conduct a two sample equal variance F 
test, to test the similarity in variance between the rPTE and 
rALL distributions; this was to determine the similarity in 
Table 2  All pairs trades (rALL) distribution measures, risk measures 
and test statistics
a PTE denotes PT during an operational event, and SD denote stand-
ard deviation, for all tables
b Test for rALL distribution against Normal distribution N(0,3.65)
Measure Value (%) Test statistic




Third moment − 0.20
Fourth moment 4.25
VaR 99% − 10.22
VaR 98% − 8.14
VaR 95% − 5.84
VaR 90% − 3.99
Table 3  Change in values and test statistics: pairs trades during an 
operational event rPTE compared to all trades (rALL)
a Two sample F test for test of equal variance
Measure Change in value (%) Test statistic
Expected return 0.08 Sampling 
confidence 
levels
 ± 0.066% 
(95%)
 ± 0.056% 
(90%)





Fourth moment − 2.44
Table 4  Change in value at risk and test statistics: pairs trades during 
an operational event rPTE compared to all trades (rALL)
a Test for rPTE distribution against Normal distribution N(0, 3.27)
VaR risk Change in VaR 
(%)
Test statistic







Table 5  Change in values, risk measures and test statistics: pairs 
trade event returns rE compared to all trades (rALL)
a Test for rE distribution against Normal distribution N(0, 3.27)
Measure Change in 
value (%)
Test statistic
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risk between rPTE and rALL on a SD risk measurement basis. 
In Table 3 we also provide the rALL expected return sam-
pling confidence intervals, so that the range of potential rALL 
expected return values (for the given sample size) are known 
(at the given confidence intervals). This would enable us to 
determine if the expected return for rPTE is statistically dif-
ferent to rALL, or if rPTE is different.
In Table 5 we provide the change in values for risk meas-
ures and other measures in comparing rALL against rE results. 
We also conduct a Kolmogorov–Smirnoff test for the rE dis-
tribution against N(0, 3.27), a Normal distribution with 0 
mean but with same SD as rE. The PTE results of Table 1 
(or Tables 3, 4) are analysed further by OE type and busi-
ness line in Tables 6 and 8, respectively; the PTE results of 
Table 6  Pairs trade return 
during an operational event 
(rPTE) by operational event type
a See Table 10 for abbreviations of event type categories
Return (%) Event  typea
OPR FIN FEX PME WPS PDA BP
Expected return 4.35 − 0.82 0.43 0.49 − 2.76 0.69 − 0.69
Annualised expected return 226.20 − 42.64 22.36 25.48 − 143.52 35.88 − 35.88
Annualised median return 208.90 − 17.31 14.81 4.75 − 37.45 48.00 − 43.55
Annualised Return Interquartile range 210.67 240.53 181.93 104.20 333.08 274.76 133.52
Table 7  Change in pairs 
trades during an operational 
event (rPTE) compared to all 
pairs trades (rALL) values: by 
operational event type
Measure Event type
OPR FIN FEX PME WPS PDA BP
SD (%) − 0.87 0.08 0.03 − 2.12 0.83 − 0.36 − 1.08
VaR 99% (%) 10.07 − 1.26 0.80 8.82 0.04 4.05 3.63
VaR 98% (%) 8.14 − 1.51 − 0.25 6.74 − 1.90 2.58 2.87
VaR 95% (%) 6.27 − 0.04 0.43 4.45 − 3.79 2.12 1.60
VaR 90% (%) 4.86 − 1.15 1.21 3.14 − 4.96 1.25 0.56
Third moment (%) 0.43 − 0.69 − 0.16 1.30 − 0.64 − 0.36 0.61
Fourth moment (%) − 4.97 − 2.67 − 2.51 − 3.66 − 5.23 − 4.54 − 1.83
Table 8  Pairs trade returns during an operational event (rPTE): by business line
a See Table 11 for abbreviations of business line categories
Return (%) Business  linea
EXT DCM CSD CRT CRF CMB AMA ABL
Expected return (%) − 1.36 − 0.59 2.48 0.85 0.97 − 0.97 1.80 − 0.70
Annualised expected return (%) − 70.72 − 30.68 128.96 44.20 50.44 − 50.44 93.60 − 36.40
Annualised median return (%) − 73.35 − 34.67 166.68 40.34 46.43 − 33.93 84.10 − 3.17
Annualised return interquartile range (%) 64.42 74.42 392.54 54.66 112.86 214.89 149.63 108.64
Table 9  Change in pairs trade 
returns during an operational 
event (rPTE) compared to all 
pairs trades (rALL): by business 
line
Measure Business line
EXT DCM CSD CRT CRF CMB AMA ABL
SD (%) − 2.30 − 1.95 1.37 − 2.55 − 1.66 − 0.63 − 1.11 − 1.09
VaR 99% (%) 6.44 7.05 6.27 9.07 6.86 1.89 6.30 4.17
VaR 98% (%) 4.49 4.99 4.27 7.08 5.07 0.75 6.45 3.10
VaR 95% (%) 2.57 2.77 2.11 5.03 3.64 0.47 4.15 0.80
VaR 90% (%) 1.24 1.06 0.50 3.62 2.95 − 0.76 4.17 − 0.25
Third moment (%) 0.42 0.70 0.23 0.27 − 0.11 − 0.03 − 0.77 − 0.81
Fourth moment (%) − 3.27 − 3.56 − 5.50 − 3.73 − 3.88 − 3.72 − 1.76 − 4.12
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Table 2 are also analysed further by OE type and business 
line in Tables 7 and 9, respectively.
In Table 1, we observe there is significant variation in 
expected PT returns by categories; expected PT returns are 
2.28%/year for All trades (PT for rALL), 6.19%/year for PTE 
trades (PT trades for rPTE) and 8.79%/year for event trades 
(rE). The difference in average returns in rALL, rPTE and rE is 
also supported by the annualised median returns in Table 1, 
which is considered a more robust indicator of average val-
ues than the mean. The interquartile range for annualised 
returns for rALL is approximately 15% more than the range 
for rPTE or rE. As the interquartile range is a standard meas-
ure of variability or dispersion, therefore the probability dis-
tribution for rALL is more dispersed than for rPTE or rE. Also, 
recall that rE represents the PT return due to the OE itself, 
hence the OE itself leads to a PT return that is almost four 
times the rALL returns.
Table 1 results show that PT returns increase by more 
than double during an OE compared to no OE occurring 
during the PT, that is rPTE is more than double rALL. For 
statistical robustness, we calculated rALL expected return’s 
sampling confidence intervals, at the 95% an 90% quantile 
values, and the values are given in Table 3. Therefore the 
0.08% increase in expected return from rALL to rPTE is outside 
the range of any sampling error, hence it is a statistically 
significant increase in expected returns.
Table 1 results clearly demonstrate that OE significantly 
impact relative firm value. In fact the rE annualised expected 
returns are almost equivalent to the average annual returns 
on the stockmarket (approximately 10%/year). The impact 
of OE upon firm value, and more importantly relative firm 
value, implies that financial technology has an important 
role in competitive advantage and therefore strategy. For 
example financial technology could provide insight into 
competitive advantage and relative firm value being lost 
from poor process management and execution, or poor work-
place practises (e.g. unnecessary losses due to overriding 
trading limits). The results also suggest that any operational 
gains through FPAS could lead to significant increases in 
relative firm value.
The contribution of financial technology to relative firm 
value also occurs through them having a key role in ena-
bling any strategic goal. For example, firms frequently focus 
on good customer service to gain strategic advantages over 
competitors [76]. The financial technology would enable 
strong customer service by ensuring there is low external 
fraud, internal fraud and strong business practices. In an 
industry sector such as banking, the operational advantage 
of a competitor can be a significant and unique selling point.
In Table 2 we conduct the Kolmogorov–Smirnoff test to 
assess the similarity of the rALL distribution to N(0, 3.65). 
As can be seen in Table 2 the test statistic is Dcrit = 0.07 and 
does not exceed the critical values at the 5% and 10% signifi-
cance levels (0.013 an 0.011, respectively). Consequently, 
we cannot reject the hypothesis that the rALL distribution is 
different to a Normal distribution [N(0, 3.65)]. This implies 
that the rALL distribution is not an unusually shaped distribu-
tion, that is neither heavily bias towards positive or negative 
values (as might be the case with other distributions), hence 
easier to model and risk manage.
Table 2 provides some useful results. Firstly, OR meas-
ured on the basis of VaR is not negligible; at the VaR 99% 
level we have − 10.22% and − 3.99% at the 90% level, both 
relating to a 1 week time interval. As the approximate annual 
return on the stock market is 10%/year, the VaR results at 
the 99% level imply that an average share price growth can 
be erased in a period of 1 week. Although the 99% level is 
a highly unlikely event, the results imply that OR can cause 
significant losses to relative firm value. Hence it is important 
for operational systems not to be complacent about a lack of 
significant losses to relative firm value, for when they occur 
they can be large in magnitude.
In Table 3 we conducted a two sample equal variance F 
test upon rPTE and rALL distributions’ variances, to determine 
if both distributions have the same risk, statistically, on a 
SD risk measurement basis. The test statistic is Fcrit = 1.24 
and this exceeds the significance values at the 5% and 10% 
significance levels (1.15 and 1.12, respectively). Therefore 
we can reject the hypothesis that the rPTE and rALL distribu-
tions have equal variance. Hence the OR and relative firm 
value changes during OE will be different to those during 
Table 10  Categories for operational event types and abbreviations
Abbreviation Event type
BP Business practices
PDA Physical asset damage




OPR Other operational events
Table 11  Categories for business lines and abbreviations
Abbreviation Business line
ABL All other business lines
AMA Asset management business line
CSD Custody business line
CMB Commercial banking business line
CRF Corporate finance business line
CRT Corporate trust business line
DCM Discretionary fund management business line
EXT External clients business line
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All trades, implying that financial technology impact the OR 
and relative firm value in companies.
Table 3 results show that the skewness difference between 
the rPTE and rALL distributions is negligible (close to 0), 
hence both distributions are fairly symmetric and do not suf-
fer from skewness risk (underestimation of risk). However 
from Table 3 we observe that there is significant difference 
in kurtosis between rPTE and rALL distributions (− 2.44), rALL 
has almost double the kurtosis. A lower kurtosis implies 
that the rPTE distribution tends to concentrate around mean 
more than the rALL distribution and so the rPTE distribution 
values can be considered more predictable. This is useful 
for operational analysis because it means losses associated 
with financial technology would be more predictable, due 
to the lower kurtosis.
Table 4 results show the difference in VaR between rALL 
and rPTE and there is a change of 0.14–1.70% in VaR value, 
which is approximately a 10–20% difference; the change 
is even greater between rALL and rE, which is a change of 
0.19–1.76% in VaR value. The lower OR in rPTE and rE com-
pared to rALL on a VaR risk measure basis is also supported 
by the SD risk measure. This is an unexpected result, since 
returns increase during an OE yet risk decreases (typically 
we expect return to increase with risk under the standard 
assumption of risk aversion [77]). Therefore not only do 
operational factors have a contribution to relative firm value, 
but they also do so at lower risk. Such information is useful 
for operational products because it suggests that such prod-
ucts can contribute to relative firm value without having to 
incur substantially more risk.
In Tables 4 and 5, the Kolmogorov–Smirnoff tests were 
undertaken to test rPTE and rE distributions’ similarities 
against a Normal distribution with 0 mean but with the same 
respective SD. As both distributions have identical SD, both 
distributions were tested against N(0, 3.27). For both tables 
the test statistic is given as Dcrit = 0.08 and both distributions 
reject the hypothesis that either are statistically similar to 
N(0, 3.27) at the 10% significance level, as 0.08 exceeds 
D10% = 0.07. However, at the 5% significance level it less 
certain if both distributions differ from N(0, 3.27) because 
Dcrit = D5% = 0.08. Therefore, whereas the rALL distribution 
tends to follow a Normal distribution, the PT distributions 
during OE can be considered statistically less Normal. This 
is useful to know because non-Normal shaped distributions 
tend to be a common cause of mis-estimation of losses, as 
they are harder to model and risk manage.
Table  5 results relate to the rE distribution and we 
notice they provide similar values for the same measures 
in Tables 3 and 4. This is partly to be expected because 
rE is related to rPTE by the equation rPTE = rNPT + rE, hence 
risk and return values will be related. However, the high 
amount of similarity also implies that the majority of rPTE 
values can be attributed to rE. This is useful for financial 
technology design because it implies relative firm value 
is driven more by specific OE, hence design should focus 
around such events rather than generic operational issues.
Tables 6 and 7 decompose the OE returns and risk 
measurements by OE type, as listed in Table 10. In Table 6 
we have the PT returns by OE type and we observe signifi-
cant variation in returns: OPR has the highest annualised 
expected return (208.90%), the lowest annualised expected 
return is WPS (− 143.52%) and the average annualised 
PT return is 6.24%. The annualised median returns also 
support that OPR has the highest PT return (although at 
a slightly lower value of 208.90%), however BP has the 
lowest return at − 43.55% (instead of WPS). We also notice 
that there are varying differences between median and 
expected return values e.g. PME and WPS have substantial 
differences whereas OPR and BP are similar.
Table 6 provides important insights. Firstly, as men-
tioned previously, the results support the analysis that rela-
tive firm value (or equivalently competitive advantage) is 
strongly dependent on the type of OE, with wide variation 
in relative firm values between OE. The wide variation 
in not just restricted to the expected return but also the 
interquartile range varies significantly by OE. Secondly, 
the magnitude of the returns in Table 6 is significant: 
given that average stock market returns are approximately 
10%/year, the OPR return of 226.20% and the WPS return 
of − 143.52% the OE represent a high and wide range of 
returns. Hence financial technology can maximise com-
petitive advantage by strategically reallocating resources 
to focus on specific OE types, rather than focussing on less 
critical operations or having a generic operations focus. 
Moreover the high magnitude supports the point that finan-
cial technology have a key role in business strategy.
In Table 7 we provide OR measurement by event type 
with a range of risk measures, specifically SD, VaR at dif-
ferent quantiles, 3rd and 4th moments. Similar to Table 6, 
we notice that there is significant dependence and vari-
ation in OR by event type, at all different measures of 
OR. Intuitively, we would expect OR to be considerably 
dependent on the OE type, as some operations tend to be 
more risky than others e.g. external fraud (event FEX) is 
considered more risky than process management errors 
(event PME).
Table 7 results give important observations into OR. 
Firstly, the wide variation in OR implies that financial tech-
nologies should carefully concentrate on operational areas to 
minimise risk, rather than having a generic OR management 
strategy. A strategic reallocation may lead to risk reduction 
e.g. shifting focus from FEX to FIN (internal faud). Sec-
ondly, given that optimal contributions of relative firm value 
and OR differ in terms of OE, one needs to examine both 
aspects to achieve the correct contribution to firms. There 
is wide variation in magnitude with OE in terms of return 
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and OR (the change in OR under a VaR 99% risk measure is 
0.04% for FEX but 10.07% for OPR).
In Table 7 we notice that there is significant variation in 
skewness and kurtosis; OPR, PME and BP are more posi-
tively skewed (compared to the rALL distribution), whereas 
FIN, FEX, WPS and PDA are more negatively skewed. 
Hence the positively skewed distributions will lead to more 
negative returns and similarly the negatively skewed distri-
butions will give more positive returns. In terms of kurtosis, 
Table 7 implies that the OE tend to have a lower kurtosis 
compared to the rALL distribution, hence the OE distributions 
tend to be less peaked and so are more spread out. The varia-
tion in kurtosis and skewness leads to kurtosis and skewness 
risk, namely that skewness and kurtosis can lead to over or 
under estimation of risk. This is important as one may be 
more exposed to incorrectly estimating risk depending on 
the type of OE they are engaged in.
In Tables 8 and 9 the PT results during OE (rPTE) are 
categorised by business lines. In Table 8 we notice that the 
magnitude of the expected PT returns is significant for all 
business lines. This is also supported by the median returns, 
which are considered a more robust indicator of average val-
ues, in that they are also a similar magnitude to the expected 
returns. Intuitively, we expect MIS systems to have a sig-
nificant contribution to relative firm value across all busi-
ness lines because MIS nowadays play an important func-
tion in all aspects of all business lines in banks. Similarly, 
the results imply that FPAS would be beneficial across all 
business lines and this may account for the fact that such 
products being available across a range of banking business 
lines nowadays.
In Table 8 we notice that the variation in interquartile 
ranges, medians and expected returns are substantially lower 
than in Table 6. The interquartile range in Table 8 is an aver-
age of 158% whereas in Table 6 it is 211%; the variation in 
expected returns in Table 8, is approximately half the vari-
ation in Table 6. Therefore we can deduce that the variation 
in relative firm value is more due to the OE type rather than 
the business line origin. This is an important observation 
because it implies strategically allocating financial technolo-
gies along business lines is not as effective as allocating 
along particular OE types.
In Table 9 the OR measurement is given in terms of SD 
and VaR at various quantiles and the OR values are similar 
in magnitude to the OR values in Table 7. Hence we can 
infer that OR is not substantially influenced by business line 
more or less than the OE type in terms of magnitude. How-
ever, within the set of different business lines in Table 9 we 
notice that there is substantial variation in risk; at a VaR 
99% level the change in VaR value (compared to the rALL 
distribution) is almost 5 times greater in CRT than in CMB. 
Therefore in strategically resourcing we cannot purely focus 
on OE but also must take into account the business line to 
optimise contribution to relative firm value and competitive 
advantage.
In Table 9 the variation in skewness and kurtosis between 
business lines is higher than the variation in both for OEs in 
Table 7; in Table 9 the average values for skewness and kur-
tosis are − 0.07 and − 3.8 (respectively) whereas in Table 7 
they are 0.01 and − 3.4 (respectively). Therefore in terms 
of skewness and kurtosis risk, the business lines present a 
greater challenge in correctly estimating risk compared to 
OE. This is important as the results imply that firms are 
more exposed to incorrectly estimating risk depending on 
the business line, rather than the OE. Hence to minimise 
risk, firms may wish to change the business line for financial 
technology to reduce risk.
5  Conclusion
In this paper we investigated the relation between financial 
technology, OR and relative firm value (or equivalently PT 
returns). We provided a method of measuring relative firm 
value performance, related to OR, using the PT methodol-
ogy. Our method is supported by our empirical results which 
demonstrate PT returns significantly differ during OE com-
pared to general PT returns.
Using over 11,000 PT data and OE data we investigated 
the impact of financial technology on relative firm value 
growth and OR. We found that operational factors substan-
tially impact relative firm value growth, implying that finan-
cial technology can play a crucial role in the competitive 
advantage of firms and their strategies. Additionally OR was 
measured and shown to be of a sufficient magnitude to sig-
nificantly impact firm value, implying that financial technol-
ogy has an important role in risk management.
We have found that relative firm value growth and OR is 
substantially influenced by the origin of the OE in terms of 
the OE type and the associated business line. Consequently, 
MIS and FPAS should focus on specific OE and take account 
of business lines to maximise relative firm value growth, or 
minimise OR. Additionally, financial technology could play 
a significant role in new risk management approaches.
In terms of implications for policy and management 
within the banking sector (especially with respect to IT 
managers), the firm should take into account the relative 
value and the risk management contributions that operations 
potentially provide. In particular, strategically reallocating 
MIS and FPAS to specific operational areas, rather a generic 
operational strategy, would be a more effective approach. 
Operational risk and operational issues should be taken into 
account varying levels within policy and decision making.
In terms of future research we would like to investigate 
the impact of FinTech in the area of investment, in par-
ticular whether retail and institutional investors are able to 
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benefit from higher returns in investments without neces-
sarily increasing risk. We would also like to investigate how 
FinTech is contributing to financial innovation in the mar-
ket, such as the creation of new financial asset classes and 
derivatives that are facilitated by technology. Finally, we 
would like to investigate the impact of FinTech upon future 
risk management practices, as FinTech may impact how risk 
is monitored and managed.
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